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THE VIETNAMESE JUDICIARY: THE POLITICS OF
APPOINTMENT AND PROMOTION
Penelope (Pip) Nicholson and Nguyen Hung Quangt
Abstract: This Article contends that while the Vietnamese judiciary and court
system have been the subject of not insignificant reforms over the last two years, they
remain political institutions. More particularly, our analysis of the manner and criteria
for the appointment and dismissal of judicial officers characterizes these officers as
having to act within the auspices of the Communist Party of Vietnam, despite reforms
having been introduced that cast the courts as more independent.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002 the Vietnamese government amended the Law on the
Organization of People's Courts1 ("2002 Law") and the Ordinance on
Judges and Jurors of People's Courts ("2002 Ordinance").2 The changes
have been heralded as evidence of the government's commitment to an
"independent court system." 3 This Article argues that, upon closer analysis,
these reforms will not culminate in an "independent" court system as that
term is understood in the West. Rather, the reforms produce a system of
I The authors would like to thank the editors of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their
generous assistance. They also thank Kerstin Steiner and Nguyen Hien Quan, both doctoral students at the
University of Melbourne, for their research assistance. Pip Nicholson is the Associate Director (Vietnam)
of the Asian Law Centre at the University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia and Nguyen Hung Quang is
the Managing Partner, NH Quang & Associates, Hanoi, Vietnam.
1 Order 13 on Court Organization and Judges was introduced on January 24, 1946. However, there
were substantial challenges to its implementation (in particular, the war) and therefore the court system was
not effectively introduced until the Law on the Organization of People's Courts of July 26, 1960. The Law
on the Organization of People's Courts has been amended several times since that date. Ordinarily, the
amendments follow constitutional amendments. See LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S COURTS,
(July 13, 1981); LAW TO AMEND THE 1981 LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S COURTS, (Jan. 4,
1989); LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE' COURTS (Oct. 6, 1992); LAW TO AMEND THE LAW ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S COURTS (Jan. 10, 1994); LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S COURTS
(Apr. 2, 2002). Most Vietnamese laws are published in Cong Bao (Official Gazette), although it was not
available via subscription the last decade. Two excellent on-line searchable databases are the National
Assembly database located at http://www.vietlaw.gov.vn/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2004) (in Vietnamese) and a
database introduced by the law firm Phillips Fox at http://www.vietnamlaws.com/ (last visited Oct. 27,
2004) (in English). These are subscription databases. Copies of older laws (pre-1994) informing this paper
were obtained before the existence of databases and before Cong Bao was widely available. Copies of
these older laws were sourced from friends with access to copies of Cong Bao. Copies on file with the
authors.
2 See infra Part II for details concerning the introduction of these laws.
3 See, e.g., Politics & Law: Supreme Court Takes Over Judiciary, SAIGON TIMES DAILY, Oct. 1,
2002, at 1.
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courts increasingly managed by the Supreme People's Court, with the
historically strong role of the National Assembly and the Ministry of Justice
radically constrained. However, the reformed courts will continue to operate
within the auspices of and subject to the influence of the Communist Party
of Vietnam ("CPV"). In short, reforms to the appointment of judges have
done little to change the status quo in the short term. The effects of the
changes over the medium- to long-term remain largely speculative.
After a brief exploration of Vietnamese legal history and the place of
law and courts in contemporary Vietnam (Part II), the criteria and
procedures for the appointment of Vietnamese judges are discussed in Parts
III and IV.4 The paper also considers judicial term and tenure (Part V),
promotion (Part VI) and judicial discipline and dismissals (Part VII). This
Article argues that the latter aspects of the court system discussed in Parts V-
VII are integral to appointments generally and are central to understanding
the ongoing significance of the CPV to court management and
jurisprudence. In conclusion, it is contended that in large part CPV
influence remains very strong in the Vietnamese courts.
The authors do not causally link independent court systems and
methods of judicial appointment. For example, Australia arguably has an
independent court system in the Western liberal legal tradition.5 However,
in Australia the government of the day appoints the judges in a non-
transparent manner.6  However, in the Vietnamese context, the ongoing
significance of the CPV in judicial appointments (and dismissals) precludes
the Vietnamese court system from being free from political influence in the
short term.
Before turning to analyze the provisions regulating the appointment
and dismissal of Vietnamese judges, we wish to make some general
observations about the Vietnamese legal system. This will assist to place the
subsequent discussion in context.
II. CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF VIETNAMESE LAW
The Communist Party of Vietnam is a political party which
gained society's almost absolute confidence and is able to call
4 It is artificial to discuss the appointment and removal of judges in terms of criteria and then
procedures. Each of these aspects of the appointment and removal ofjudges affects how the other is given
effect. However, for the sake of clarity this divide will be maintained. See Pip Nicholson, Appointing High
Court Judges: Need for Reform?, 68 AUSTL. Q. 69 (1996).
5 Or as Ugo Mattei puts it, a "professional" legal system as opposed to one predicated on political
influences or traditional values. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law, 45 AM. J. COMp. L. 5 (1997).6 Nicholson, supra note 4, 69-70.
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on the support of all the people. Moreover, in the first years of
the people's democratic system, the distinction between the
leadership of the Party and the administration of the State was
out of the question because the State could not be present
everywhere in the country and the secret Party cells had to play
the role of the State. Such practice became a social rule which
was hard to challenge.
Nguyen Nhu Phat
A. Contemporary Debates
The role of law in Vietnam today is unclear: it is perhaps best
described as in flux, with various contending views as to the role law ought
to have.8 The majority of commentators correctly point out that the
Vietnamese legal system, like its economy, is in transition and uncertainties
about its new form and orientation remain.
9
The State and Party have committed to the establishment of nha nuoc
phap quyen, perhaps best translated as law-based state.'
0 The commitment
to a law-based state was formally launched in 1991, at the Seventh Party
Congress. This policy choice was reflected most clearly in changes to
Article 4 of the 1992 Vietnamese Constitution, which was amended to read
"all Party organizations operate within the framework of the Constitution
and the law."" The Party had not previously been exhorted to act within the
7 Nguyen Nhu Phat, The Role of Law During the Formation of a Market Driven Mechanism, in
COMMERCIAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM: VIETNAMESE AND FOREIGN COMMENTARIES 
398
(Gillespie ed., 1997).
8 Bibliographies on Vietnamese law include: Barbara James, Vietnamese Law in English: A Selected
Annotated Bibliography, 84 SUMMER L. LIBR. J. 461 (1992); Phuong Kharih Nguyen, How to Conduct
Research in Vietnamese Law, 27(3) INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 307 (1999); Penelope (Pip) Nicholson,
Vietnamese Law: A Bibliography, 22 (2/3) LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 139 (2003).
9 Russell Heng Hiang Klng, Leadership in Vietnam: Pressure for Reform and Their Limit, 15(1)
CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 98 (1993); Penelope Nicholson, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law: The
Vietnam Court Experience, 3(1) AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 37 (2001); INTER-AGENCY STEERING COMMITTEE,
REPORT ON COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS ASSESSMENT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIETNAM'S LEGAL SECTOR
FOR THE PERIOD 2001 - 2010, 11, 12 (2002); John Gillespie, Concepts ofLaw in Vietnam: Transforming
Statist Socialism, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF L. 146 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004).
'o John Gillespie, The Political-Legal Culture of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Vietnam, in
CORRUPTION IN ASIA: RETHINKING THE GOVERNANCE PARADIGM 180 (Tim Lindsey & Howard Dick eds.,
2002); see also Gillespie, supra note 9, at 151-53. Compare with Vietnamese scholarship which translates
"Nha nuoc" as "state" and "phap quyen" as "rule of law." See, e.g., "nha nuoc phap quyen" as "rule of law
state" (5 NGHIEN CUU LAP PHAP (LEGISLATIVE STUDIES MAGAZINE) 2 (2002)) or "state under rule of law"
(I NGHIEN CUU LAP PHAP (LEGISLATIVE STUDIES MAGAZINE) 2 (2002)).
" VIETNAM CONST. OF 1992, art. IV. An unofficial English translation of the 1992 Vietnam
Constitution is available from the website of the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the
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framework of the law.' 2 In the ensuing decade the State has implemented a
range of measures to give effect to a socialist law-based state.1 3
The transition from socialist-planned economy to a socialist-oriented
market economy with a law-based state is qualitatively different from a
transition to a market economy under the rule of law.' 4 In particular, the
State continues to adjust to a prior conception of the law as a tool of the
revolution, where law was conceived and used instrumentally.15  In other
words, the Party-State commits to an evolving conception of law as a
regulatory force binding the Party-State. In this transition an uncertain role
emerges for other pre-existing regulatory influences/mechanisms (such as
policy), to augment and supplement the society's evolving legal base. So
while the Party-State avows the central role of law, its institutions and agents
continue to lead by relying on an amalgam of law and policy. This is
different from Western conceptions of the rule of law, which are complete
with assumptions about the independence of the judiciary and the separation
of law and politics.'
6
In this conception of a law-based state, Party policy continues to be as
influential as law. In the Vietnamese context political-legal relations are
summarized in the phrase "the party leads and the State manages. 17 Party
leadership is not exclusively located within political institutions (usually
referred to as administrative institutions such as the National Assembly,
courts and ministries), but also in the Party apparatus itself.18 This Party
machine generates policy and leads the State. This means that although the
legal and political institutions and functions in Vietnam are increasingly
separated, this separation does not necessarily curtail the separately founded
Party leadership. The Party's leadership is manifested in Party policy
documents and via the extensive hold the Party has over senior government
and legal offices. 19  In effect, law remains intrinsically political. This
United States of America at http://www.vietnamembassy-usa.org/learn/gov-constitutionl.php3 (last visited
Nov. 15, 2004).
12 Vietnamese constitutions, like those of other socialist states, are hortative rather than prescriptive.
Christopher Osakwe, The Common Law of Constitutions of the Communist-Party States, 3 REV. OF
SOCIALIST L. 155, 206-209 (1977).
13 For example, the State has introduced a raft of legislation on matters as diverse as investment,
legal institutions and complaints procedures. See Nicholson, supra note 8, at 139-200.
:4 Gillespie, supra note 9, at 146-82.
's Id.
16 David S. Clark, The Many Meanings of the Rule of Law, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER
IN ASIA 28 (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999).
:7 See Gillespie, supra note 10, at 167-200.
,s Phat, supra note 7, at 398.
9 John Gillespie writes of this phenomenon as the nomenklatura system of the Communist Party of
Vietnam. See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 10, at 180-81.
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formulation of the role of law enables law and the courts to remain at least
responsive to, and at most a tool of, the political leadership.
In contrast, rule of law assumes the importance of separating political
20
and legal institutions, with the latter settling legal issues. In particular, rule
of law conceives of the state as bound by law and liable for any breaches.
Rule of law also assumes that political power is located in political
institutions: for example, separations between courts and parliaments are
meaningful.
21
B. History and the Vietnamese Legal System
Contemporary Vietnamese law also reflects complex historical
influences. Most commentators agree that northern Vietnam's legal system
is an amalgam of Imperial Chinese, colonial French, and Soviet influences.
2
More recently, donors and entrepreneurs have advocated reforms to support
the marketization of the economy, producing a diverse set of civil and
common law influences from various sources including Sweden, United
States of America, Canada, Japan and Australia to name a few.23
It is also simplistic to debate influences on the Vietnamese legal
system in terms of transplanted laws and legal norms. Again, most
commentators are in agreement that philosophical and moral influences
resonate in Vietnam, variously affecting the role and place of law. For
example, Confucianism (whether Chinese or Indian) and Marxist moral
24influences affect the place of law in contemporary Vietnam.
20 To assume a settled meaning for the rule of law is misleading. For a discussion of the range of
interpretations of rule of law, see Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls?:
Problems and Prospects of US-Sponsored "Rule of Law" Reform Projects in the People's Republic of
China, CID Working Paper No. 47, at 9-10 (May 2000). See also Clark, supra note 16.
21 See Clark supra note 16.
22 See M. B. HOOKER, A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA (1978); M. B. HOOKER,
LAWS OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA, ch. 10 (1986); Phan Huu Chi, The People's Prosecutor's Office, in
INSTITUTIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 82 (1973); Mark Sidel, Law Reform in Vietnam:
The Complex Transition from Socialism and Soviet Models in Legal Scholarship and Training, UCLA PAC.
BASIN L. J. 221 (1993); Mark Sidel, Vietnam, in ASIAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: LAW, SOCIETY AND PLURALISM IN
EAST ASIA 356, 360-362 (Poh-Ling Tan ed., 1997) [hereinafter Sidel, Vietnam].
23 For a useful list of current legal reform projects see UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME, LEGAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT PAST, ONGOING AND PLANNED DONOR PROGRAMMES, at
http://www.undp.org.vn/themes/govemance/matrix.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
24 See Shaun Kingsley Malamey, Culture, Virtue and Political Transformation in Contemporary
Northern Viet Nam, 56(4) J. ASIAN STUD. 899 (1997). Malamey convincingly argues the continuity
between Confucian morality and socialist morality. This has also been asserted by Mark Sidel. See, Sidel,
Vietnam, supra note 22, at 360-362. Sidel cites Harvard University Prof. Hue Tam Ho Tai as lecturing on
these connections. Id. at 361. See also Penelope Nicholson, Borrowing Court Systems: The Experience of
the DRVN 1945 - 1976, ch. 10, (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Melbourne) (on file
with the University of Melbourne library); Christoph Giebel, Museum-Shrine: Revolution and its Tutelary
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Vietnamese legal history and legal culture merit a more profound
discussion than this Article on the appointment and dismissal of judges can
provide. However, in the context of this Article, certain features of the
Vietnamese legal system need to be noted. The Vietnamese legal system, in
particular its courts, remains largely a tool of the State.25 It is also a system
whose normative force is moderated by the very strong moral precepts
affecting daily life and state administration. 26 Moreover, the courts' socialist
history resonates today and socialist ethics remain significant in decision-
making.
27
C. Continuity and Change in Vietnamese Court History
Very shortly after Ho Chi Minh's declaration of independence in
1945, the Vietnamese Revolutionary Government established a civil judicial
system parallel with the newly established military system.2 8 From 1946
onwards the Vietnamese court system was hierarchical, comprising three
levels: district, provincial and supreme courts.29 Set up as accountable to the
National Assembly under the 1946 Vietnamese Constitution, the court
system remains accountable to the National Assembly today. Then as now,
judges and people's assessors (sometimes translated as jurors) appear at all
levels of the court system and in both the civil and military court systems.3 °
Other legal professionals, such as court clerks and evaluators (whose work it
is to assess judgments of inferior courts and to assist judges) have also
existed since 1946. Similarly, since inception, at least in theory, parties have
been able to seek review of judgments as well as to appeal them. In effect,
Spirit in the Village of My Hoa Hung, in THE COUNTRY OF MEMORY 92-95 (Hue-Tam Ho Tai ed., 2001)
(arguing that concepts of 'proper rule' that pre-dated Confucianism are being revived in contemporary
Vietnam).
25 See generally Nicholson, supra note 9; Penelope Nicholson, The Vietnamese Courts and
Corruption, in CORRUPTION IN ASIA, supra note 10, at 201; Brian J. M. Quinn, Vietnam 's Continuing Legal
Reform: Gaining Control Over the Courts, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 12, 431 (2003).
26 Malarney, supra note 24; Pham Duy Nghia, VIETNAMESE BUSINESS LAW IN TRANSITION 1-27
(20027. For example, the experience of the land and military courts continues in Vietnamese memory
today. For analysis of these, see BERNARD FALL, THE VIET MINH REGIME GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (1956); Nicholson, supra note 24, ch. 3.28 Nicholson, supra note 24, ch. 3.; Dang Quang Phuong, Vai net ve qua trinh hinh thanh va phat
trien cua Toa an Nhan dan [Some sketches of the Establishment and Development of the People's Court],
in TONG THUAT KET QUA NGHIEN CUU DE TAI CHINH [FINAL ABSTRACT ABOUT PRINCIPAL RESEARCH]
(unpublished work on file with author).
29 For a short discussion about the development of the Vietnamese court system see Nicholson,
supra note 9, and Quinn, supra note 25, at 432-68. See also Nicholson, supra note 24.
30 VIETNAM CONST. OF 1946, art. 64, 65. The exception to this general proposition is that jurors are
no longer used in the Supreme People's Court. LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S COURTS, art. 18
(2002).
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many of the central features of the court system-its personnel, structure,
and review of its decisions and processes for accountability-have officially
remained constant.3 In contrast, how judges come to hold office and how
they are removed has been the subject of considerable debate and some
reform. 32
III. JUDICIAL SELECTION CRITERIA
There are currently 9117 employees working for the court system in
Vietnam, of whom 3466 are judges.33 These judges are appointed to a court
and not to a particular jurisdiction for a period of five years. At present, the
court system lacks 1287 judges.34  In particular, the courts lack 193
provincial court judges and 1067 district court judges.3 5 Further, many
district courts in remote areas have only one or two judges.36
At the end of 2001, Vietnam amended its fourth Constitution.37 Like
its 1992 predecessor, this Constitution provides that the rights and duties,
remuneration and procedures for appointment, removal and dismissal of
38judges will be provided for by law. On January 2, 2002, the Communist
"' Nicholson, supra note 9; Brian J. M. Quinn, Legal Reform and Its Context in Vietnam, 15 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 219 (2002). In a forthcoming paper Nicholson argues that court practices have indeed changed
over the last decade, while the responsibilities of the courts have remained constant. See Nicholson,
Vietnamese Court Reform: Constancy and Change in the Contemporary Period, Paper presented at
Victoria University, Victoria, Canada (May 28, 2003) (on file with author).
32 Sac lehn so 13/SL [Presidential Order No. 13 on Court Organization and Judges] (Jan. 24, 1946)
provided five criteria for judicial appointment, compared with the Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of
People's Courts (May 14, 1993), which had seven criteria and the Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of
People's Courts (Oct. 11, 2002), which also has seven criteria. Under the applicable legislation in 1959,
judges at the local level were elected by the local People's Councils. The Standing Conmnittee of the
National Assembly elected Supreme Court Justices and the Chief Justice was appointed by the President.
33 Resolution No. 353/2003/NQ-UBTVQH1 1, On the Personnel and the Quantity of Judges in the
Supreme People's Court (Feb. 25, 2003). Article 1 stipulates the need for 523 personnel for the Supreme
People's Court, of which 120 ought to be judges. Resolution No. 355/2003/NQ-UBTVQH 11, On the
Personnel and the Quantity of Judges for Local People's Court (Feb. 25, 2003). It also stipulates the need
for 3064 personnel to work in Provincial People's Courts, of which 1118 ought to be judges. Article 2
stipulates the need for 5936 personnel, of which 3515 ought to be judges. Tran Van Tu, Head of the
Personnel Dept. of the Supreme People's Court, Doi moi to chuc va hoat dong cua toa an nhan da
[Reforming the Organization and Operation of People's Courts], 1 TAP CHI NGHIEN Cuu LAP PHAP
[LEGISLATIVE STUDIES MAGAZINE] 34-39 (2003).
34 Tran Van Tu, supra note 33.
35 id.
36 Id.
31 Vietnam's 1992 Constitution was amended by National Assembly Resolution No. 51/2001/QHIO
dated Dec. 25, 2001.
31 VIETNAM CONST. OF 1992, art. 128. See generally Penelope Nicholson, Vietnamese Legal
Institutions in Comparative Perspective: Contemporary Constitutions and Courts Considered, in LAW,
CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 300 (Kanishka Jayasuriya
ed., 1999).
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Party of Vietnam Politburo passed Resolution No. 08/NQ-TW on Justice
Reform.39 The central feature of this resolution was to reform the justice
system with a view to strengthening the investigation organizations,
prosecution systems and, most importantly, the judicial system. The reforms
were introduced to create a law-based state with a socialist orientation.
Accordingly, the National Assembly revised the Law on the Organization of
the People's Court, passing new legislation on April 2, 2002.40 This law
claims twin over-arching objectives: to improve the effectiveness of the
courts and to ensure judicial independence.41 In October 2002, the
Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of People's Courts was introduced to
complete the legislative reforms.42
A. Legal Knowledge
According to the 2002 Law on Organization of the People's Court and
the 2002 Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of People's Courts, a person who
wants to become a judge in Vietnam has to be a Vietnamese citizen and
satisfy the following criteria: 
43
- Demonstrate loyalty to the motherland and the Constitution of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam;
- Have good morality, not be corrupt and be truthful;
- Firmly defend socialist legality;
- Have a bachelor of law degree and be trained professionally in trial
work;
- Have judicial capacity;
- Have good health for the exercise of the assigned tasks;
- Have a number of years of legal work experience: (i) A supreme
court appointment must have five years of trial experience in
provincial courts or ten years relevant experience; (ii) a provincial
court judge must have five years of trial experience in district
'9 Politburo Resolution No. 8-NQ/TW, On Justice Reform (Jan. 2, 2002).
'0 LAW ON ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S COURT (2002).
41 Id.
42 ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS, No. 02/2002/PL-UBTVQH1 1 (Oct.
11, 2002) [hereinafter ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 20021.
43 LAW ON ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S COURT, art. 37 (2002); ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS
OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 5. All analysis of these instruments is based on official English language
translation of laws published by Cong Bao (Official Gazette) in volumes No. 25 and No. 60, published in
2002, respectively.
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courts or ten years of relevant experience and (iii) a district court
judge four years experience.44
The criteria for judicial appointment seem all too rarely applied. In
particular, the 1993 criterion of legal knowledge and its 2002 variant
requiring a law degree have not been enforced because the limited number
of judicial candidates has forced the State to relax its requirements.
Following the passage of the 1993 Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of
People's Courts, the Standing Committee of National Assembly adopted
Resolution No. 37/NQ-TVQH9 on May 14 1993, allowing judicial
appointments where not all criteria had been met. According to this
Resolution, those possessing good morals, judicial capacity and good health,
but having neither the required work experience nor the legal qualifications
could still be appointed judges.45
Following the passage of the 2002 Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of
People's Courts, the State again officially recognized the need to relax the
professional qualifications of judges by passing Resolution No. 13 1,46 which
continues the application of Resolution No. 37. Thus, as a senior officer of
the Supreme People's Court explained, Bachelor of Law degrees should be
mandatory under the new Ordinance,47 but the State officially recognizes
that it will be some time before this ideal can be met.
Both Resolution 37, and its successor Resolution 131, create a new
class of judicial appointment where the appointee is classified as owing a
"legal knowledge debt" (no kien thuc phap ly) to his or her employer, and
undertakes to obtain a law degree after appointment. 48  The Chief Judge
must cooperate with the relevant agencies to create advantageous conditions
4 ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 5(1), ch. III, arts. 20-22.
45 Nghi Quyet Cua Uy Ban Thuong Vu Quoc Hoi So 37 NQ/USTVQH9 Ngay 14/5/1993 Quy Dinh
Mot So Diem Ve Vieo Thi Hanh Phap Leni Ve Tham Phan Va Hoi Tham Toa An Nhan Dan [National
Assembly Standing Committee Resolution No. 37/NQ-UVTVQH9, Providing Some Points Relating to the
Implementation of the Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of People's Courts] (May 14, 1993).
46 National Assembly Standing Committee Resolution No. 131/2002/NQ-UBTVQH1 1, Providing
Some Points Relating to the Implementation of the Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of People's Courts
2002 (Oct. 4, 2002).
47 See Hoai Linh, Tham phan phai giu minh, PHAP LUAT NEWSPAPER, No. 78/2002, Nov. 14, 2002,
at 7. Mai Ngoc Trinh, the Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme People's Court, commented on the new
Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of People's Courts, stating that "Phap lenh moi yeu cau bat buoc doi voi
njuoi duoc bo nhiem phai co trinh do cu nhan luat va da duoc dao tao ve nghiep vu xet xu (dut khoat khong
cho "no" bang nhu truoc) [the candidates for judicial positions must have university law degrees and be
trained in judging skills (definitely not accept education certificate debt as in previous times]."
48 Nghi Quyet Cua Uy Ban Thuong Vu Quoc Hoi So 37 NQ/USTVQH9 Ngay 14/5/1993 Quy Dinh
Mot So Diem Ve Vieo Thi Hanh Phap Lenh Ve Tham Phan Va Hoi Tham Toa An Nhan Dan [National
Assembly Standing Committee Resolution No. 37/NQ-UVTVQH9, Providing Some Points Relating to the
Implementation of the Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of People's Courts] (May 14, 1993).
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for these judges to study law.4 9 One of Vietnam's Vice Justice Ministers, Le
Thi Thu Ba, alleged "more than 1000 present judges have repaid the 'legal
knowledge debt' by obtaining a law degree as requested by law."
50
However, this claim must be balanced against the fact that eighty-five
percent of judges and seventy percent of court officers have obtained law
qualifications, but not Bachelor degrees.5 1
As a result of the most recent amendments, a judge needs to hold a
bachelor degree in law. Judges need not, as previously set out, hold the
more general qualification of a "law degree certificate." For example,
procurators and investigators graduating from the Police College, the
Security College or the Procuracy College are described as holding a "law
degree," while in fact their qualifications are certificates in law from
specialist training institutions. Yet these lesser qualifications are classified
as "law degrees" in analyses of judicial qualifications. So the seventy
percent of judges who hold "law degrees" include an unidentified number
52holding the lesser law certificate qualification. Dr. Nguyen Van Hien,
Chief Justice of Supreme People's Court, has claimed that these
qualifications should not be classified as sufficient for judicial selection.53 It
remains to be seen whether the earlier practice of accepting these
qualifications will change.
In effect, the legal qualifications requirement is undermined by
current practice. Judges may become increasingly competent over the
medium- to long-term, but it is not currently possible for the State to recruit
university-trained lawyers. This paper does not take up the larger issue of
legal training in Vietnam, but it is not contentious to suggest that Vietnam's
law universities offer a much broader curriculum than specialist training
colleges, and therefore better prepare judges for judicial office.54
49 Thong Tu Lien Nganh Toa An Nhan Dan Toi Cao Bo Tu Phap So 05/TTLN Ngay 15 Thang 10
Nam 1993 Huong Dan Thuc Hien Mot So Quy Dinh Cua Phap Lenh Ve Tham Phan Va Hoi Tham Toa An
Nhan Dan [Ministry of Justice and Special People's Court Inter-Circular No. 05/TTLN, Guide on the
Ordinance on People's Judges and Jurors], pt. I, 1(b) (Oct. 15, 1993).
50 Le Thi Thu Ba, Cong tac quan ly toa an nhan dan dia phuong va van de nang cao trinh do van
hoa xet cu cua cac toa an [Local People's Court Management and Judging Cultural Enhance of People's
Courts], 7 TAP CHI THONG TIN NGHIEN Cuu KHOA HOC PHAP LY [JUDICIAL SCIENCE INFORMATION
REVIEW] 149 (2001).
51 Tran Van Tu, supra note 33. The types of qualifications this encompasses include certificates
from specialist training institutions such as the Procuracy Training School.
52 /d.
53 Nguyen Van Hien, Tieu chuan tham phan-thuc trang va nhung yeu cau dat ra trong thoi ky moi
[Judicial Criteria - Current Situation and Requirements for New Era], 4 TAP CHI TOA AN NHAN DAN
[PEOPLE'S COURT JOURNAL] 5 (2001).
54 Bui Bich Tii Lien, Legal Education in Transitional Vietnam, in ASIAN SOCIALISM AND LEGAL
CHANGE: THE DYNAMICS OF VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE REFORM (Penelope Nicholson and John Gillespie
eds., forthcoming 2005) (on file with authors).
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B. Morals and Loyalty
Article 2 of Circular 01 and the 2002 Law require the following
qualities of candidates for judicial office: loyalty to the Fatherland and to the
socialist Constitution, good ethical qualities (seemingly cast as "incorrupt
and honest"), and capacity to protect socialist legislation.55 To pass the good
morals and loyalty threshold an applicant must:
- Not commit any act detrimental to the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Fatherland, the entire-people's
defense, the socialist regime and the State of the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam;
- Strictly abide by the Constitution and laws, undertakings of the
Party and policies of the State, lead a sound and healthy life, and
respect public rules;
- Resolutely struggle against persons and acts harmful to the Party,
the Fatherland and people;
- Respect the people, devotedly serve the people, have close links
with the people, attentively listen to their opinions and place
themselves under the people's supervision; resolutely fight
corruption, wastefulness and all signs of red-tape, imperiousness
and authoritarianism;
56
- Have the spirit of self-criticism and criticism to protect justice;
- Be free of criminal liability and not currently undergoing
disciplinary procedures.
57
Finally, candidates must complete a property declaration form and include it
in the Application Dossier.58
Other concepts integral to the criteria for judicial appointment set out
in 2002 have yet to be defined clearly. For example, it is not clear how to
interpret the requirement of "defending socialist legality." It would appear
" LAW ON ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S COURT, art. 37 (2002); ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS
OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 5(1); Inter-Circular No. 01/2003/TrLT/TANDTC-BQP- BNV-
UBTWMTTQVN, Guiding the Implementation of a Number of Provisions of the Ordinance on Judges and
Jurors of the People's Courts, art. 2 (Apr. 1, 2003).
56 This is consistent with the Ordinance Against Corruption (Feb. 26, 1998).
57 Inter-Circular No. 01/2003/TTLT/TANDTC-BQP- BNV-UBTWMTrQVN, Guiding the
Implementation of a Number of Provisions of the Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of the People's Courts,
art. 2 (Apr. 1, 2003).
Id.
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that Circular 01 (as well as the prior Circular 05) provides that the judicial
application dossier must contain a "Political Theory Diploma" (chung chi
trinh do ly luan chinh tri), and that this requirement goes some way towards
detailing how loyalty to the motherland and commitment to socialist legality
can be demonstrated. 59
These criteria remain flexible and capable of diverse interpretation. In
turn, this gives selecting judges broad discretion. It is not possible to
comment with any certainty how that discretion is used, but to date no
private lawyer has been appointed and, by implication, those with
appointment power have a predisposition toward the status quo. This can be
legitimated by invoking flexible and ill-defined qualitative criteria.
C. Adjudicative Capacity and Good Health
It is not clear what "adjudicating professional capacity" to resolve
cases entails. 60  This term had not been defined prior to Circular 01.61
Although Circular 01 attempts an explanation in Article 6, its meaning
remains vague. 62  This leaves the "assessment" of the professionalism
criteria for judges unclear.63 Pham Quy Ty, Chief Judge of Hanoi People's
Court, has suggested that professional capacity will be demonstrated via the
time worked in the court system in combination with a judicial training
certificate from the Legal Professional Training School.64
59 Ministry of Justice and Special People's Court Inter-Circular No. 05/TTLN, Providing Guidelines
for the Ordinance on People's Judges and Jurors, pt. III, item 1 (Oct. 15, 1993); Inter-Circular No.
01/2003/TTLT/TANDTC-BQP-BNV-UBTWMTI'QVN, Providing Guidelines for the Implementation of a
Number of Provisions of the Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of the People's Courts, pt. III, item 5.d. (Apr.
1, 2003); ORDINANCE AGAINST CORRUPTION (Feb. 26, 1998).
60 Mai Bo, Can sua doi Phap lenh tham phan va hoi tham nhan dan [Ordinance on People's Judges
and Jurors Should Be Amended], 2 TAP CHI TOA AN NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S COURT JOURNAL] 1 (2000).
61 Bui Ngoc Son, Tu tuong Ho Chi Minh ve to chuc too an va y nghia hien nay [Ho Chi Minh 's
Ideology on Court Organization and its Significance Today], 2 TAP CHI NGHIEN Cuu LAP PHAP
[LEGISLATIVE STUDIES MAGAZINE] 26 (2002).
62 Article 6 provides "[hjaving the capability to perform the adjudicating work' means having the
ability to well fulfill the adjudication of cases and settle other work falling under the jurisdiction of the
courts of the corresponding levels.., having valuable legal writings and/or in-depth legal researches [sic]
which have been publicised or applied to reality." Inter-Circular No. 01/2003ITLT/TANDTC-BQP-
BNV-UBTWMTTQVN, Guiding the Implementation of a Number of Provisions of the Ordinance on
Judges and Jurors of the People's Courts, art. 6 (Apr. 1, 2003), translated in 31 CONG BAG [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE] (2003).
63 Id.
64 Pham Quy Ty, Cac yeu to ve to chuc lao dong, phuong tien va dieu kien lam viec cua can bo toa
an anh huong den van hoa xet xu [The Influence of Labor, the Means and Working Conditions of Court
Officers (Judges, Clerks and People's Assessors), on Judicial Culture], 7 TAP CHI THONG TIN NGHIEN CUU
KHOA HOC PHAP LY [JUDICIAL SCIENCE INFORMATION REVIEW] 134, 148 (2001) (written while Dr. Pham
Quy Ty was Head of the Local Court Management Division, Ministry of Justice).
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The current practice is for judicial appointments to come from the
ranks of court officers, clerks, military officers, arbitrators (including
arbitrators from defunct arbitral organizations), investigators, procurators
(with "judging experience") and legal experts of governmental bodies. In
addition, employees of communist and politico-social organizations who
have passed a judicial training course at the Legal Professional Training
School are also said to possess the requisite judicial capacity.65 The most
common work history leading to judicial appointment is experience as a
court clerk, evaluator or other court officer.6 This means that although the
criterion of "judicial capacity" remains vague, work history in a state legal
organization opens up the possibility of judicial appointment.
In giving effect to the requirement of judicial capacity, it appears that
judicial appointments value older personnel. In particular, "song lau len lao
lang" ("glory with age") is a maxim used to describe the type of person
valued by the courts.67 The Chief Justice of the Supreme People's Court
writes that judicial capacity, as a criterion for appointment, explicitly calls
68for persons of mature years.
The health criterion set out in Circular 01 requires "good physical
strength and appearance." 69  In addition to the physical appearance of
judges, the Circular states that judges must be "without malformation and
strange shape" (khong di tat, di hinh). The Circular alleges that these may
"affect the posture and performance" of a judge (anh huong toi tu the va viec
thuc hien nhiem vu). 70 In effect, the provisions provide that there can be no
physically-challenged judges.
Party influence is then implicitly maintained through the "adjudicative
capacity" criterion by enabling the Party-State to primarily select judges
from the pool of staff already employed by the courts. Those selecting
judges chose from a known pool of candidates whose work performance can
be monitored and judged against consistently vague criteria.
65 Nguyen Van Hien, supra note 53 (written while Dr. Hien was the Chief Justice of the Supreme
People's Court).
66 Id. See also Pham Quy Ty, supra note 64, at 140.
67 Pham Quy Ty, supra note 64, at 140.
68 Id. See also Nguyen Van Hien, supra note 53.
69 Inter-Circular No. 01/2003/TTLT/TANDTC-BQP-BNV-UBTWMTTQVN, Guiding the
Implementation of a Number of Provisions of the Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of the People's Courts,
pt. I, item 7 (Apr. 1, 2003).
70 id.
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D. Party Endorsement
In addition to the above-mentioned criteria, the Party endorses
candidates. Under the now-outdated Circular 05, a candidate's application
dossier had to include an "opinion letter from the Communist Party cell" (y
kien cua cap uy).71 This letter had to come from the level of the court to
which a person applied.72 In effect, a candidate applying to be a provincial
court judge needed a letter of support from a provincial court cell of the
Communist Party. Candidates had either to be members of the Vietnam
Communist Party or be capable of endorsement by the Party. If this was not
the case, it would not be possible to obtain the letter.
While Circular 01 does not explicitly reiterate the need for the
"opinion letter from the Communist Party cell," it seeks an "assurance of the
principle of Party leadership over personnel works [sic]" (bao dam nguyen
tac Dang lanh dao doi voi cong tac can bo).73  Therefore, some scholars
maintain that the courts will continue to seek opinion letters in order to
ensure that Party oversight over judicial appointments remains intact.74 The
combined effect of an assurance of Party Leadership over nominated
candidates and a Political Theory Diploma is that non-Party members will
very rarely become judges. As one of the Vice-Ministers of Justice notes,
the "opinion of communist cells (cap uy) on the lists of judicial applicants
will be considered as moral and political guarantees. 75 More significantly,
"when the communist cell does not agree to introduce a person then the
governing body shall give up him/her even if s/he satisfies most of the
criteria and conditions for judicial appointment., 76
In practice, the local Party officials retain significant influence on the
work of courts by vetting appointments to the Committee of Judges of any
one provincial court. For example, three months after the introduction of
71 Ministry of Justice and Special People's Court Inter-Circular No. 05/TTLN, Guiding the
Ordinance on People's Judges and Jurors, pt. III, item 2 (Oct. 15, 1993).
72 Id.
" Inter-Circular No. 01/2003/TrLT/TANDTC-BQP-BNV-UBTWMTTQVN, Guiding the
Implementation of a Number of Provisions of the Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of the People's Courts,
pt. V (Apr. 1, 2003). The term "personnel works" is used in the translation offered by Cong Bao (Official
Gazette). It might be better translated as "matters relating to personnel."
74 Pham Hong Hai, MO HINH LY LUAN BO LUAT TO TUNG HINH SU VIETNAM [THEORETICAL MODEL
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF VIETNAM] 60 (2003). Tran Van Tu, Doi moi to chuc va hoat dong cua
toa an nhan dan [Reforming the Organization and Operation of People's Courts], 11 NHA NUOC VA PHAP
LUAT [STATE AND LAW MAGAZINE] 16 (2003).
75 Le Thi Thu Ba, supra note 50, at 155-56.
76 Nguyen Thi Hong Tuoi, Bo nhiem, Nhan chuc, Thuyen chuyen, Mien Nhiem va Cach chuc Tham
phan theo phap luat hien hanh [Judicial Appointment, Tenure, Secondment, Disappointment and Removal
according to current laws], 5 TAP CHI LUAT HOC [JURISPRUDENTIAL REVIEW] 76 (2000).
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Article 29(1) of the 2002 Law on the Organization of People's Court, which
provides that the Committee of Judges at a provincial court will include
judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme People's Court upon
nomination of the Provincial Court's Chief Justice, one province had failed
to establish a Provincial Judge's Committee. In this case the relevant court
Communist Party Cell did not approve the nominees identified by the Chief
Justice.77 The Chief Justice had successfully appointed justice committees
for another sixty provincial courts.7 8
In addition, when an applicant seeks a Political Theory Diploma from
the National Political Academy (which is managed by the Communist Party)
he or she needs to be a communist party member or a candidate member.
Dr. Hien, Chief Justice of Supreme People's Court, defends the requirement
of the Political Theory Diploma, writing that "the judges at all court levels
should be trained in politics effectively and strongly to implement judicial
responsibility and to protect against the phenomenon of 'mechanical and
simple legalism, non politics' (may moc, phap ly don thuan, vo chinh tri).79
As a result, some ninety percent of appointed judges are Communist
Party members 80 and, in effect, owe responsibilities to the Party over and
above any duty to the development of the law. Ordinarily, judicial officers
strive to develop the law in line with party leadership. Thus, little conflict
emerges for judges in practice. Nevertheless, this obligation to Party
leadership distinguishes judges in Western systems from those in Vietnam's
Communist-led Party-State.
E. Judges as Civil Servants
In addition to the specific provisions relating to judicial appointments,
the laws relating to civil servants also apply to judges.81 As a result, judges
have to satisfy the criteria for the recruitment of civil servants. 82 This raises
the question whether before becoming a judge, a candidate must be a civil
7" BAO CAO TONG KET CONG TAC NGANH TOA AN NHAN DAN NAM 2002 VA PHUONG HUONG
NHIEM VU CONG TAC NGHANH TOA AN NHAN DAN NAM 2003 [SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT REPORT ON THE
OPERATION OF THE COURTS IN THE YEAR 2002 AND TASK ORIENTATION FOR THE YEAR 2003] 14 (Jan. 8,
2003)48 d.
79 Nguyen Van Hien, supra note 53.
go Le Thi Thu Ba, supra note 50, at 156.
"' ORDINANCE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, art. 1(4) (1998) (translated in 10 CONG BAO [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE] 3 (Apr. 10, 1998).
2 ORDINANCE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, art. 1(4) (1998) (translated in 10 CONG BAO [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE] 3 (Apr. 10, 1998); Government Decree No. 95/1998/ND-CP, On Recruitment, Use and
Management of Civil Servants, art. 6. (Dec. 2, 1998).
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servant. There is no document that resolves this issue. The legal documents
relating to the appointment of judges state that "a Vietnamese citizen" may
be appointed as a judge.8 3 Yet not just any citizen can receive a Political
Theory Diploma: the National Political Academies select their trainees and
they are required to be civil servants, communist members or military
officers.84
F. Contemporary Criteria for Appointment in Context
The above criteria appear to focus on documentary formalism (chu
nghia giay to) rather than demonstrated capacity.85 That is to say that if a
candidate can produce all the correct documents and letters of support, the
candidate may be appointed irrespective of skills or qualifications. The
Party recognizes that the lack of expertise may explain some of the
weaknesses of the current court system. 6 This was specifically noted in the
Communist Party's Resolution No. 8, dated January 2, 2002, which
identified a lack of judges and suggested that those appointed often have
insufficient knowledge and professional capacity.8 7 Examples of judicial
failings referred to in Resolution No. 8 included "failing to convict
criminals" (bo lot toi pham), "unjust decisions affecting innocent persons"
(lam oan nguoi vo toi), and "violating the freedom and democracy of
citizens" (vipham quyen tu do dan chu cua cong dan).88
Numerous challenges remain for Vietnam in its appointment of
judges. In particular, the political vetting of candidates via the requirements
of a Political Theory Diploma, the assurance that candidates follow Party
leadership, and the ambiguous public servant criterion, militate against the
selection of non-party political appointments. Further, the lack of clear
instruction about the level of legal knowledge required of judges results in
appointments which the State itself deems insufficiently qualified for the
judicial office. Perhaps the fact that no practicing lawyer has been appointed
as a judge despite the fact that this professional group offers many
candidates that meet the legal (if not the political) criteria, best illustrates the
" ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 5; Inter-Circular No.
01/2003/TLTTANDTC-BQP-BNV-UBMTTQVN, Providing Guidelines for the Ordinance on Judges
and Jurors of People's Courts, art. 2 (Apr. 1, 2003).
84 Ministers Council (now called Government) Decision No. 91/HDBT, On Organization and Tasks
of Central Administrative College (Sept. 26, 1981).
:5 Bui Ngoc Son, supra note 61, at 26.
86 Interviews by Penelope Nicholson with two judges of the Supreme People's Court and the Hanoi
Provincial Court (Jan. 2004) (granted on the basis of anonymity).
87 Politburo Resolution No. 8-NQ/TW, On Justice Reform, 1 (Jan. 2, 2002).
88 id.
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limited nature of the reforms and the constraints under which existing
reforms are being implemented.89
IV. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT PROCEDURE
Thus far we have seen that the criteria for judicial selection are likely
to produce candidates loyal to the Party and its policies. Similarly, the
process by which a person applies for judicial office precludes, as a matter
of practice, an independent person (non-State functionary) from becoming a
judge. The nature of the appointment panel and the requirements of the
application dossier, both explained below, essentially require that judges be
Party members with established track records of politically-sensitive
decision making.
A. The Dossier Requirement
As discussed supra, the procedures for the appointment of judges are
set out in general terms in the 2002 Law on Organization of People's Courts
and the Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of People's Courts.90 Circular 01,
Chapter III provides additional details. It requires that an application dossier
include:
- A completed Supreme Peoples' Court application to work as a judge;
- A resume and photo together with certification from the Party Central
Committee's Organization Commission;
- The property declaration in the form required by the Decree on Anti-
corruption; 91
- Notarized copies of the law degree, legal professional qualifications,
Political Theory Diploma, and other certificates (if any) which may be
relevant to the selection and appointment of judges;
- The candidate's self-criticism statement;
92
- Recommendation from the head of agency where the candidate
currently works;
89 Author Nguyen Hung Quang is not aware of any private practitioner having been appointed as a
judge since 1945 in the north of the country and since 1976 in the reunified Vietnam.
90 LAW ON ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S COURT, art. 37(5) (2002).
91 Government Decree No. 13/2002/ND-CP, On Amendment of and Supplement to Government
Decree No. 64/1998/ND-CP dated Aug. 17, 1998 Providing Details of the Ordinance Against Corruption
(Jan. 30, 2002).
92 Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defense and SPC Inter-circular No. 01/TTLN (Apr. 1, 2004).
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The record of the vote as to the candidate's suitability for the position
taken within the agency, unit, or organization where the candidate
currently works;
The verification of the number of persons who voted and the result;
The written proposal of the Chief Judge of the provincial-level
People's Court or the Central Military Court to select and appoint a
candidate to judicial office.93
Once the dossier is finalized, it is delivered to the Judicial Selection
Council for consideration. The Judicial Selection Council at each level
considers the dossiers for that level and then submits a list of preferred
appointees to the Chief Justice of Supreme People's Court.94
B. Who Appoints Judges?
According to the 1992 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, the President of Vietnam will nominate the Chief Justice of the
Supreme People's Court for appointment by the National Assembly. 95 The
National Assembly will then "elect" the Chief Justice or, in effect, confirm
the President's candidate. 96 Previously, the detailed provisions relating to
the appointment of judges 1ave the President the power to appoint all judges,
irrespective of court level. 9
More recently, the 2001 Constitutional amendments and consequent
2002 amendments to the Law on Organization of People's Court,98 have
reduced the appointment powers of the President and increased the Chief
Justice's power to appoint. As a result, the President now only appointsjudges to the Supreme People's Court. Other judges are appointed by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme People's Court.99 The Chief Justice exercises
this power to appoint lower level judges based on lists of preferred
appointments received from the Judicial Selection Council at the relevant
levels. 100 Chief justices or deputy chief justices at the local level are
93 id.
9' LAW ON ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S COURT, art. 40(3) (2002).95 VIETNAM CONST. OF 1992, arts. 84 & 103.
96 id.
97 LAW ON ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S COURT, art. 38 (2002).98 VIETNAM CONST. OF 1992, arts. 84, 103 (including amendments in 2001); LAW ON ORGANIZATION
OF PEOPLE'S COURT (2002).
99 Politburo Resolution No. 8-NQ/TW, On Justice Reform, pt. II, sec. B, art. 2.c. (Jan. 2, 2002).
1'o Id.; LAW ON ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S COURT, art. 40(3) (2002); ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND
JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002. arts. 27 and 28.
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appointed by the Chief Justice upon approval of the relevant local People's
Council. 101
C. The Role of the Judicial Selection Councils
The 2002 Law on Organization of People's Courts provides that the
National Assembly Standing Committee issue new regulations concerning
the work and function of the Judicial Selection Councils.10 2 As a result, on
October 11, 2002, the Standing Committee of the National assembly issued
the Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of People's Court. 0 3  Under this
Ordinance the new Supreme People's Court Judicial Selection Council and
Central Military Court Judicial Selection Council are both chaired by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme People's Court.' 0 4 In addition, each Judicial
Selection Council comprises representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior (sometimes translated as
Ministry of Home Affairs), 0 5 the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central
Committee,10 6 and the Vietnam Lawyers Association.'
0 7
The provincial and district Judicial Selection Councils are chaired by
the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the relevant Provincial People's Council,
and include the Chief Judge of the Provincial People's Court, representatives
of the Provincial Department of Governmental Personnel, the Provincial
Vietnam Fatherland Front, and Vietnam Lawyers' Association as
members.' 0 8 Military Zonal and Regional Judicial Selection Councils are
chaired by the Chief Judge of the Military Central Court and have
representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Vietnam Fatherland Front
Central Committee and Vietnam Lawyers' Association as members. 0 9
Judicial Selection Councils are ad-hoc committees operating on the
basis of "collective decision-making and majority vote" (lam viec tap the,
101 LAW ON ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S COURT, arts. 25(7), 40 (2002).
102 Id. art. 37(5).
103 ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002.
"o4 Id. art. 26.
10s The Dept. of Governmental Personnel was renamed the Ministry of Interior in 2002 under Nghi
Quyet Cua Quoc Hoi So 02/2002/QH 11 Ngay 5 Thang 8 Nam 2002 Ve Viec Quy Dinh Danh Sach Cac Bo
Va Co Quan Ngang Bo Cua Chinh Phu [National Assembly Resolution No. 02/2002/QH1 I, Regarding the
Enumeration of Committees and Ministries] (Aug. 5, 2002).
'0" The Vietnam Fatherland Front is a popular organization with social and political responsibility to
represent the people.
'0' ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 26.
'o' Id. art. 27.
"9 Id. art. 28.
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quyet dinh theo da so)."0 During meetings the Judicial Selection Councils
closely evaluate each candidate on the list. First, a member of the Judicial
Selection Council presents all of the documents in the application dossier.
Second, the remaining committee members express their opinion on the
suitability of the candidate, prior to a show of hands from those in favour of
the appointment."' Decisions of Judicial Selection Councils are made by a
majority vote and any dissent is noted in the minutes of the meeting." 2
One weakness in the current judicial appointment procedures is that
there are no time limits for either the preparation of application dossiers, or
for the provision of information from relevant agencies for the application
dossiers. For example, the current workplace of the applicant or the
Communist party cell of the court to which the applicant seeks appointment
can take as long as it wishes to provide the documents sought. Further, there
is no regulation of the time-frame in which Judicial Selection Council
decisions must be made. The authors have been advised that as a matter of
practice, the period for completing an application dossier for judicial office
is normally one year and sometimes even longer."13
A further weakness is that existing judges who have satisfactorily
performed their duties cannot renew terms automatically or even with an
abridged procedure. Upon the expiry of a judge's term, those judges
wishing to serve further must present a new application dossier."14  This
dossier must then be considered afresh by the relevant Judicial Selection
Council." 5 This process is cumbersome and requires unnecessary work by
both the judges seeking re-appointment and the Judicial Selection Councils.
11' ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 25.2; Quyet Dinh Cua Chanh
an Toa an Nhan Dan Toi Cao So 46/2003/QD-TCCB Ngay 02 Thang 4 Nam 2003 Ve Viec Ban Hanh Quy
Che Lam Viec Cua Hoi Dong Tuyen Chon Tham Phan Toa an Nhan Dan Cap Tinh Tham Phan Toa an
Nhan Dan Cap Huyen Va Hoi Dong Tuyen Chon Tham Phan Toa an Quan Su Cap Quan Khu Tham Phan
Toa an Quan Su Khu Vuc [Decision No. 46/QD-TCCB, Promulgating the Working Regulation of the
Judicial Selection Councils of the Provincial Level People's Courts, District Level People's Courts and
Military Zone Level Military Courts], art.2 (Apr. 2, 2003).
1 Quyet Dinh Cua Chanh an Toa an Nhan Dan Toi Cao So 46/2003/QD-TCCB Ngay 02 Thang 4
Nam 2003 Ve Viec Pan Hanh Quy Che Lam Viec Cua Hoi Dong Tuyen Chon Tham Phan Toa an Nhan
Dan Cap Tinh Tham Phan Toa an Nhan Dan Cap Huyen Va Hoi Dong Tuyen Chon Tham Phan Toa anQuan Su Cap Quan Khu Tham Phan Toa an Quan Su Khu Vuc [Decision No. 46/2003/QD-TCCB,
Promulgating the Working Regulation of the Judicial Selection Councils of the Provincial Level People's
Courts], art. 7 (Apr. 2, 2003).
112 id.
113 Interviews by Nguyen Hung Quang with two judges of the Hanoi People's Court, one judge from
the Supreme Court and one officer of Central Committee of Vietnam Fatherland Front (2002) (granted on
the basis of anonymity).
114 Mai Bo, supra note 60, at 3.
Is d.
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Commentators believe that the lack of an abridged procedure for existing
judges is one of the reasons there is a lack of judges at the local level. 
1 16
There is no evidence on hand that applicants rely on favorable
sentiment or treatment (yeu to tinh cam) to obtain appointment to the bench
quickly (nhanh). Nor is there public evidence of individuals or agencies
forcing (ep) or suggesting (goi y) the need for applicants to pay bribes to
obtain the necessary documentation for the application dossier. However,
without time limits on the provision of information, there is ample
opportunity for dubious actions (khuat tat) both by the applicant and by
those assisting with the preparation of necessary materials. Finally, there is
also no publicly available evidence that corruption affects the actual decision
to appoint a judge. It is possible that the show of hands required at the
council meeting protects against corruption.
However, the dossier requirement, in combination with the selection
process and the composition of the selecting bodies, ensures that the Party-
State has not relinquished any control of this phase of judicial selection.
While the process is arguably more democratic and allows both the Supreme
People's Court and local input into appointments, Party-State control has not
been unsettled.
V. JUDICIAL TENURE AND TERM
Unlike most civil servants in Vietnam who enjoy lifelong
appointments, judges are appointed to five-year terms.1 17  As discussed
above, at the end of each term a judge must resubmit an application for a
new term. Thus, judicial office does not offer judges job security. More
significantly, any claim of judicial independence is fundamentally
undermined by the lack of tenure. Not only can judges be arbitrarily
removed," 8 but a Judicial Selection Committee can determine not to re-
appoint judges giving no reasons for this decision. This also allows the State
to tightly control who will remain judges.
Under the 1992 Constitution, the term of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme People's Court is set to coincide with the election of the National
Assembly and National President (also on five-year terms)." 19 The terms of
office of the Vice-Chief Judges of the Supreme People's Court and the Chief
116 Pham Quy Ty, supra note 64, at 142; Le Thi Thu Ba, supra note 50, at 159; Tran Van Tu, supra
note 51.
117 LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COURTS, art. 40 (2002); ORDINANCE ON JUDGES
AND JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 24.
IS See infra Part VII.
"9 VIETNAM CONST. OF 1992, art. 128.
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Judges and Vice-Chief Judges of local courts or military courts are also five
years from the date of appointment. 12  As civil servants, female judges must
retire at fifty-five and male judges at sixty. 121
Vietnamese judges themselves argue that a five-year term is too short
to provide the requisite security of tenure.122 Judges feel constrained during
their short term of office not to offend those who can influence their
reappointment. 23 It may be that the State needs to move gradually to life-
long tenure for judges. It could initiate reform in the first instance by
lengthening the terms of office from five to ten years. Reforming re-
appointment so that it becomes automatic unless there has been misconduct
would also diminish the current vulnerability of judges to regular political
vetting.
VI. JUDICIAL PROMOTION
There are two kinds of judicial promotion. First, in accordance with
civil servant regulations, judges can expect salary increases to reflect their
level of experience. Secondly, it is possible for judges to move between
courts and obtain the benefits of higher remuneration and status from
becoming a member of a more senior court.
A. Salary Increases
As noted earlier, judges are also civil servants broadly equivalent to
those working in other governmental agencies. As a result, most of the
criteria and procedures pertaining to the salaries of judges are the same as
those that apply to other civil servants, as set out in the relevant regulations
on civil servants.
124
Civil servants are classified into four educational categories (A, B, C
and D) based on their level of education. 125 The regulation provides that
120 ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 31 (5).
121 ORDINANCE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, art. 30 (1998) (translated in 10 CONG BAO [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE] 3 (Apr. 10, 1998)); LABOR CODE, art. 145 (1994).
122 Former Chief Justice Pham Hung, Tiep tuc doi moi to chuc va hoat dong cua nganh too an nhan
dan [Continuously Reforming the Organization and Operation of People's Court], 10 TAP CHI TOA AN
NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S COURT JOURNAL] 1-6 (1997).
123 Nicholson, supra note 38, at 320.
24 Government Decree 95/1998/ND-CP, On Recruitment, Use and Management of Civil Servants
(Dec. 2, 1998).
"Civil servants shall be classified into following categories:
1- Educational categories will consist of:
a. Civil servant in A class will have a university degree;
b. Civil servant in B class will have a college degree;
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judges be classified as "A" category civil servants, which assumes that they
hold professional qualifications from a university.'
26
Within each civil servant category, there are three classes: high level
expert, principal expert and ordinary expert.127  However, judges are not
classified according to these three divisions of expertise, but distinguished
by salary level, in turn reflecting time spent in office. Legislation sets out
the various divisions with district judges having ten salary levels, provincial
judges having nine levels and supreme court judges having seven levels (see
Table I below).' 28  Every three years, a judge will receive a salary raise,
providing all the criteria for increasing the salary have been met. In general
terms the criteria are:
- Fulfilling all assignments and meeting both quality and timing
requirements of assignments;
- Remaining without any conviction or charge for violations of
labour rules, internal office regulations and laws relating to the
jobs and ethics required of civil servants;
- Having spent enough time in office (either 24 or 36 months). 129
The Ministry of Internal Affairs' 30  has issued more detailed
regulations on assessing a civil servant's salary. The eight factors used to
determine whether to increase a civil servant's salary are:
c. Civil servant in C class will be a high school graduate;
d. Civil servant in D class will be a high school graduate.
2- Positional categories will consist of:
a. Leading officers (monitors and managers)
b. Experts." Id. art. 3.
126 Id.
127 Quyet Dinh Cua Bo Trunong Truong Ban To Chuc Can Bo Chinh Phu So 150/1999/QD-TCCP
Ngay 12 Thang 02 Nam 1999 Ve Viec Ban Hanh Quy Che Thi Nang Ngach Cong Chuc [Minister of
Governmental Personnel Decision 150/1999/QD-TCCP, On Providing Regulations on the Civil Servant
Class Upgrading Examination] (Feb. 12, 1999); Quy Che Ve Viec To Chuc Thi Nang Ngach Cong Chuc
[Minister of Governmental Personnel Working Regulation 150/1999/QD-TCCP] (Feb. 12, 1999).
12' Nghi Quyet Cua Uy ban thuong vu Quoc hoi khoa 9 so 35 NQ/UBTVQHK9 ngay 17 thang 5 nam
1993 Phe chuan bang luong chuc vu dan cu beng luong chuyen mon nghiep vu nganh Toa an Kiem sat
[National Assembly Standing Committee Decision No. 35/NQ/UBTVQHK9, On Providing the Special
Brackets of Salary Levels for Judges] (May 12, 1993).
129 Thong Tu Cua Ban To Chuc Can Bo Chinh Phu So 45frCCP-BCTL Ngay 11 Thang 3 Nam 1996
Huong Dan Che Do Nang Bac Luong Thuong Xuyen Hang Nam Doi Voi Can Bo Cong Chuc Khu Vuc
Hanh Chinh Su Nghiep Dang Doan The [Ministry of Governmental Personnel Circular No. 45/TCCP-
BCTL, On Providing Guidelines on the Raising of Annual Salaries for Civil Servants in the
Administrative System, Party Organizations and Other Political-Social Organizations], pt. II, III (Mar. 11,
1996).
... National Assembly Resolution No.02/2002/QH1, On the List of Ministries and Ministerial Line
Agencies of the Government (Aug. 5, 2002); Statement of the Government No. 38/CP-TCCB, On the
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i) Compliance with laws and policy of State;
ii) Assignment completion (quantity of completed assignments in a
year);
iii) Disciplined spirit (tinh than ky luat) (disciplinary and
organizational consciousness in working and implementing office
internal regulations);
iv) Team spirit (cooperation with relevant agencies and colleagues);
v) Truthfulness in work (truthfulness in reporting to supervisors and
accuracy of such reports);
vi) Life style and ethics;
vii) Attitude towards enhancing knowledge;
viii) Spirit and positive attitude to serve people. 31
In addition to these eight factors, managing judges are also assessed
on the results of their court's operations, managerial capacity, cooperation
with other agencies and trustworthiness as assessed by colleagues. 1
32
Table 1: Salary Coefficients of Judges
No. JUDICIAL
SCALE SALARY LEVEL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Supreme
People's 5.02 5.36 5.70 6.05 6.40 6.75 7.10
Court
2. Provincial
People's 3.62 3.88 4.14 4.40 4.66 4.92 5.18 5.44 5.70
Court.
3. District
People's 2.16 2.39 2.62 2.85 3.08 3.31 3.54 3.77 4.01 4.2
Court. 5
(Note: The current basic monthly salary is 210,000 VND)
133
Request of National Assembly Deciding the Governmental Structural Organization of the Government
(July 26, 2002).
131 Minister of Governmental Personnel Decision No. 1l/1998/QD-TCCP-CCVC, On Annual
Assessment of Civil Servants, art. 6 (Dec. 5, 1998).
132 id.
13' Nghi Dinh Cua Chinh Phu So 77/2000/ND-CP Ngay 15 Thang 12 Nam 2000 Ve Viec Dieu Chinh
Muc Tien Luong Toi Thieu Muc Tro Cap Va Sinh Hoat Phi Doi Voi Cac Doi Tuong Huong Luong Phu
Cap Tro Cap Va Sinh Hoat Phi [Government Decree No. 77/2000/ND-CP, On Adjustment of Basic Salary,
Subsidiary and Living Expenses for Persons Who Receive the Salary, Subsidiary and Living Expenses], art.
1 (Dec 15, 2000).
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The very low salary level of judges, in combination with the very
limited opportunities for promotion, must at least partly explain both the
lack of expertise and judicial corruption.134 For example, a newly appointed
district judge receives a salary of only VND 453,600 per month (VND
210,000 x 2.16 or approximately US$30.25 per month).,35 Such a low salary
base severely compromises Vietnamese judicial independence.
Furthermore, the strictly time-based nature of the promotions means that
judges within existing courts are automatically promoted to salary levels
irrespective of their performance, at least for a period of five years.
B. Promoting Judges Between Courts
The 2002 Ordinance provides for judicial promotion between different
levels of courts. However, a judge seeking promotion to a higher court must
apply for the position anew using Circular 01 procedures.
Prior to the new judicial promotion policies, promotion between the
levels of courts was rare and judges were locked into local communities and
local politics. They worked in a parochial environment with no opportunity
to leave that circuit via promotion to a higher court, or even move to a
different court at the same level. Further, the lack of promotional
opportunities meant that there was little to motivate judges to increase skills
or improve work practices. Complacency was potentially endemic,
particularly at the lowest levels of the court system where problems with
poor judging have been identified. 136
While it remains too early to judge the impact of the new promotion
policies, ostensibly judges are being encouraged to seek promotion into
higher courts. This may potentially require them to move to work out of
their districts and into provincial cities. The possibility of moving to
similarly ranked courts but in new localities opens up the real possibility of
travel for judges seeking new jobs and opportunities. Whether the selection
panels will be open to candidates outside their locality is not clear.
134 For a general discussion of the incidence and nature of Vietnamese judicial corruption see
Nicholson, supra note 25, at 201-18.
... One U.S. Dollar equals approximately 15,000 Vietnamese Dollars.
136 In June 2001, the National Assembly rejected a proposal to expand the jurisdiction of District
People's Courts in criminal matters. The proposal would enable District Court judges to deal with offences
where the maximum penalty was fifteen years, as opposed to the seven-year penalty, which is currently the
District Courts' jurisdictional limit. See Posting to Vietnam New Listserve, vnnews-l@coombs.anu.edu.au,
Vietnam MPs Vote Down Bill Boosting Powers of District Courts, June 14, 2001. See also Politburo
Resolution No. 8-NQ/TW, On Justice Reform (Jan. 2, 2002).
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VII. DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL OF ERRANT JUDGES
The power to discipline and remove judges is integral to public
confidence in any court system. Unless the State or the courts can
effectively remove those who breach agreed ethical and substantive
practices, there is no means by which the behavior of judges can be
sanctioned. At present, however, the discretionary nature of the current
regulations on the discipline and removal of judges is not transparent. As a
result, there is little to foster public trust in the existing court system.
Currently, disciplinary proceedings can be brought for political
reasons, or to punish judges whose decisions are contrary to the views of
their supervisors. The Chief Justice of the Supreme People's Court can be
disciplined or removed by the National Assembly, on the advice of the
President. 137 Deputy Chief Justices and judges of the Supreme People's
Court can be disciplined or removed by the President at the request of the
Chief Justice. 138 The Chief Justices and Deputy Chief Justices of the local
courts (at both provincial and district levels) can be disciplined or removed
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme People's Court based on the advice of
the Standing Committees of the appropriate local People's Councils.' 39 The
judges of local courts can be disciplined or removed by the Chief Justice on
a proposal of the Judicial Selection Council at the appropriate level. 140 To
dismiss a Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or a Chief Justice or
Deputy Chief Justice of a local court, it is necessary for the relevant Judicial
Selection Council to recommend removal, and for the Chief Justice to
endorse that recommendation.141
The bases of dismissing or removing judges are set out in the
Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of People's Court 2002. Under this
Ordinance, the judge is prohibited from:
Doing anything that officials and public employees are prohibited
from doing by law;
13 LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COURTS, art. 40; ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND
JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 31(1).
"' LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COURTS, art. 40; ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND
JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 27(2)(c).
13' LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COURTS, art. 40; ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND
JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 31(2).
40 LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COURTS, art. 40; ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND
JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, arts. 26-28.
141 ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 31(4).
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- Providing advice to defendants, the accused, involved parties or other
persons involved in legal proceedings, thus making the settlement of
cases or other matters contrary to law;
- Illegally intervening in the settlement of cases or abusing his or her
influence to pressure persons with responsibility to settle cases;
- Taking case dossiers or documents in case dossiers out of the office
for purpose other than performing the assigned tasks or without the
consent of competent persons;
- Receiving defendants, the accused or persons involved in legal
proceedings outside the prescribed places.1
42
Because judges are considered civil servants, the discipline and
removal of judges is not only subject to the specific rules applicable to
judges, but also to the other rules applicable to civil servants. Under the
1998 Ordinance on Civil Servants, a civil servant must not:
- Be lazy, shirk responsibilities or refuse to discharge tasks or public
duties, demonstrate factionalism, discord or departmentalism or quit
work without permission (Article 15);
- Be authoritarian, overbearing, or solicit bribes, or cause any
difficulties and troubles to organizations, agencies or individuals in
the course of his or her work (Article 16);
- Establish, take part in establishing, manage or run private enterprises,
limited liability companies, stock companies, cooperatives, private
hospitals and private scientific research institutions (Article 17);
- Work as consultants for enterprises, businesses, or service
organizations and other organizations or individuals inside or outside
the country where their work would involve State secrets, work
secrets and tasks under their competence as civil servants, as well as
perform other tasks where their consulting has a reasonable
probability of causing damage to the national interest (Article 17).
The 1998 Ordinance on Civil Servants also provides that a civil
servant who violates the laws, but not to the extent of being criminally
liable, 143 shall be subject to one of the following forms of discipline:
142 ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 15.
143 Chapter XXI of Criminal Code 1999 sets out crimes relating to the abuse of administrative
positions.
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reprimand; warning; wage reduction; demotion; removal or dismissal. 144
The seriousness of the transgression dictates the severity of the discipline.
In addition, under these provisions judges can also be removed or dismissed
whether or not they are prosecuted for criminal liability.
145
However, the law and regulations do not offer clear guidance on how
to determine whether a judge lacks the required qualities of judicial office.
Before the issuance of the new 2002 Ordinance, Vietnam had no ethical
standards for judges, 146 although a mechanism for the removal of judges was
set out. While there are now provisions on the moral qualities required of
judges,147 they remain broad and imprecise.
One issue directly affecting judicial quality is the number of "wrong
and unjust judgments" (an oan, sai). In 2002, 31.2 % of criminal judgments
and 46% of civil and family judgments were corrected. 148 However, the new
regulations have not provided a clear mechanism for removal of judges who
have a remarkable number of "wrong and unjust judgments." As noted in a
leading legal newspaper, judges with high rates of judicial error can only be
removed in accordance with the general provisions set out below. 
149
A judge can only be removed from office when he or she is dismissed
by the Supreme People's Court's Chief Justice on the recommendation of
the relevant Judicial Selection Council. 150 The Judicial Selection Council
has the power and responsibility of investigating whether a judge remains
qualified for the position and/or whether there has been a breach of the
law.
151
Where only discipline and not removal is at issue, the Chief Justice of
the court where the judge sits has responsibility for preparing a discipline
dossier. The dossier must include:
'" ORDINANCE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, art. 39 (1998) (translated in 10 CONG BAO [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE] 3 (Apr. 10, 1998)).
141 Chapter XXII of Criminal Code 1999 sets out judicial crimes, while the power to dismiss a judge
rests in Article 30(1) of the 2002 Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of People's Courts.
'46 Article 11 of the 1993 Ordinance On Judges and Jurors provided that judges "should not carry out
any other business activities or other services." It was therefore much less restrictive of judicial conduct
than the later Ordinance. See also Le Thi Thu Ba, supra note 50, at 167; Chi Thi Cua Bo Truong Bo Tu
Phap So 01/2000/CT-BTP Ngay 24 Thang 2 Nam 2000 Ve Viec Thuc Hien Cac Cong Tac Trong Tam
Nam 2000 Cua Nganh Tu Phap [Directive of Minister of Justice No. 01/2000/CT-BTP on Key Tasks of the
Judiciary in 2000] (Feb. 24, 2000).
141 ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, art. 30(2)(d).
141 See Mai Ngoc Trinh, supra note 47, at 5 (containing a part of Report of Chief Justice of Supreme
People's Court before National Assembly Congress on Nov. 13, 2002).149 See Mai Ngoc Trinh, supra note 47, at 7 (interview with the Deputy Chief Justice of Supreme
People's Court about the new Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of People's Courts).
' ORDINANCE ON JUDGES AND JURORS OF PEOPLE'S COURTS 2002, arts. 26-28.
151 id.
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- A self-criticism report prepared by the judge facing disciplinary
procedures;
- The minutes of the meeting of the Court Disciplinary Board where
that judge works.152
In cases of discipline of judges, the dossier will be reviewed and
examined by the Judicial Selection Council of the relevant court level before
its submission to the Chief Justice of the Supreme People's Court for final
decision. As discussed in Part IV, the Judicial Selection Council operates on
the basis of collective decision-making and majority vote. 153
In principle, judges, like other civil servants or National Assembly
delegates, are not requested to follow the Party's guidelines or instructions in
their decisions. In reality, most judges are Party members, 54 which means
that they must comply with the Part's rules and decisions. 155  This is
common in other socialist countries.' 5  One of the consequences of Party
membership is that judges may be disciplined by the Party's internal
procedures if it is found that they have violated the Party's rules.157 Some
researchers point out that Party discipline imposes heavier penalties than
administrative discipline. Specifically, the Party can reprimand, warn,
dismiss judges from office, or expel them from the Party.' 58  The latter
sanction is considered particularly severe. Thus, the Party may terminate a
judge's career and invoke other discipline or punishments for failure to
follow the Party mandate.
59
The rules and regulations of the Party are both political and
discretionary. As such, they are a powerful tool in the hands of the Chief
Justice and the Judicial Selection Councils. Within the Vietnamese socialist
system, the Party customarily restrains the behavior of Party members by
threatening the withdrawal of privileges such as healthcare and education.) °
In the case of judges, this is made possible by their five-year terms and the
need for documented Party approval as part of the application process.
152 Ministry of Justice and Special People's Court Inter-Circular No. 05ITLN, Guide on the
Ordinance on People's Judges and Jurors, pt. IV, 1(b) (Oct. 15, 1993).
:53 See supra Part IV.C.
54 See supra Part III.D.
155 Interview by Penelope Nicholson with an anonymous barrister (Sept. 5, 1996). See also Politburo
Resolution No. 8-NQ/TW, On Justice Reform (Jan. 2, 2002).
156 JANOS KORNAI, HE THONG XA HOI CHU NGHIA - KINH TE CHINH TRI CUA CHU NGHIA CONG SAN
[SOCIALIST SYSTEM - THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM] 35 (2002).
... STATUTE OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY 2001, arts. 2(1), 2(2), 39(1), 40(1) and 47.
' Id. art. 35.
159 KORNAI, supra note 156, at 40.
160 Qui Dinh Ve nhung dieu Dang vien khong duoc lam [Politburo Regulation No. 19-QD/TW, On
Banned Works for Party's Members] (Mar. 11, 1995).
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However, it would appear that these threats are insufficient on their own to
ensure a corruption-free and ethical judiciary.
An internal report of the Vietnamese Communist Party reports that it
reviewed and disciplined the actions of 17,288 Party members in 2001, a
figure representing 0.8% of total Vietnamese Communist Party
membership. 161  Of the 17,288 Party members investigated, 6794 were
reprimanded, 870 were removed from office, 7126 were warned, and 2498
were expelled from the Party. 62 Earlier research has demonstrated that the
State is prepared to publicly castigate judges and court clerks for improper
conduct. 63 In recent times, several cases have been reported in the press.
164
However, given that most lawyers report the need to foster good
"relationships" with judges and that it is common to make payments on
behalf of one's client, corruption is much more widespread than state
intervention indicates.'
65
VIII. CONCLUSION: COMMUNIST PARTY'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE IS INTACT
The judicial independence purportedly created by the Vietnamese
court reforms instigated since 2002 needs not be taken at face value. More
specifically, analysis of the reforms reveals that while the courts are much
more independent of both the Ministry of Justice and the National Assembly
than in the past, they remain intrinsically connected to and lead by the
Communist Party of Vietnam. As a result, any assertion that Vietnamese
judges are independent from Party-State influence is false. The Vietnam
Communist Party continues to have a firm hold on the appointment and
removal of judges.
This situation reflects the more general set-up of Vietnamese political
institutions. There is no separation of powers between the Parliament, the
executive, and the courts. The Party leads and the State manages all political
and administrative functions. The courts merely give effect to the Party
policy and law.
The appointment and dismissal of judges, in combination with the
very short terms, limited tenure, poor pay and limited opportunity for skills-
262 Tinh Hinh Thi Hanh Ky Luat Trong Dang Nam 2001 [Report on Members' Obedience to the
Communist Party's Regulations in 2001], THONG BAO NOI BO [INTERNAL NOTICE OF COMMUNIST PARTY]
13 (Mar. 2002).
162 id.
163 Nicholson, supra note 25.
16 For example, Ho Ngoc Cu, Nguyen Thap Nhat, Nguyen Thi Hang, Nguyen Dien Khoi, and Dao
Ba have all been cited for corruption.
165 See generally Nicholson, supra note 25.
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based promotion, means that judges remain tightly controlled by the Party.
While the courts and the Party may be in the process of becoming more
responsive to public sentiment, 66 this process is not reflected in an
institutional de-coupling of Party and courts.1 67 In fact, it may even be that it
confirms the interconnection between these institutions. It is not the aim of
this paper to criticise the Vietnamese courts for being different from Western
style courts. Vietnam is in the process of constructing a socialist law-based
state, which seeks to transform traditional Marxist conceptions of state and
law to those sought by the contemporary socialist-oriented market economy.
However, to the extent that claims of independence circulate, they should be
understood in light of the continuing connections between Party and courts.
16 Mark Sidel, Law, the Press and Police Murder in Vietnam: The Vietnamese Press and the Trial of
Nguyen Tung Duong, in THE MASS MEDIA IN VIETNAM 97-98 (Mart ed., 1998). See also Nicholson, supra
note 25, at 201-18.
167 For a discussion about the complex relations between the media and the state, see Russell Hiang-
Khmg Heng, Media Negotiating the State: in the Name of the Law in Anticipation, 16(2) SOJOURN 213-237
(2001).
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Table 2: Relevant Legislation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
TYPE OF L AUTHOR DATE SUBJECTLEGISLATION
Directive Chairman Ho 1/24/1946 On Court Organisation and Judges
Nol3/SL Chi Minh
Decision Ministers 9/26/1981 On the Organization and Tasks of
91/HDBT Council Central Administrative College
(now
Government)
------------ -------------------------------------- 
- - - - --
Decision 173/TTI Ministry of 2/16/1992 On the Management of the Budget
Justice of the Court of Provinces and
Districts
Constitution 1 National 14/18/1992
Assembly
-- -- - - --- -- ------ ---- -- ---- --- ---- -- -- -----------------
Law National 10/7/1992 On the Organization of the
Assembly j People's Procuratorate
Law National 10/10/1992 On the Organization of People's
Assembly 'Courts
Resolution 37 Standing 5/14/1993 To explain some issues on the
NQ/UBTVQH9 Committee of implementation of Ordinance on
N/A 1 Judges and People's Assessors
Decree 38/CP Government 6/4/1993 1 On the Authority and
Responsibility of the Ministry of
Justice
Inter-circular No. Ministry of 1 10/15/1993 Guidelines on the Ordinance on
05/TTLN Justice and I Judges and People's Assessors
Supreme Court - - -
- -- - -----
Code National 6/23/-1994 Labour Code
Assembly
-------------------------- 
-------------------................... 
--.............................................
Law National 7/5/1994 On the Organization of People's
Assembly Councils
Law Natiol 10/28/1995 o .On Amendments and Supplements
Assembly to a Number of Articles of the
People's Court Organization Law
Law National I 3/20/1996 On State Budget
Assembly _
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TYPE OF T AUTHOR DATE SUBJECTLEGISLATION
.. .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . . .. . . .. . ...
Decree No. 70- Government 6/12/1997 On Court Charges and Fees
CP
Ordinance 1Sd 1998 Ordinance on Civil Servants
Committee of
N/A
Law National 5/20/1998 On Amendments and Supplements
Assembly to a Number of Articles of the
Law on State Budget
Law National 6/12/1999 Law on the Vietnamese
Assembly Fatherland Front
Code National 12/21/1999 Criminal Code
Assembly
-------------------------------i  ---  ----- -- ------------------------- - - -
Directiv Minister of 24/00 On the Key Tasks of the Judiciary
Justice I in 2000
Law National 6/9/2000 [On the Amendment of Law on
Assembly Criminal Proceedings
- or --unis- ---- 20------ --------- - -- ---------------------------Internal Notice [Communist -200)1 ..............................
Party
Official Letter Supreme Court 2002 i Submission Report on the
No 14/2002 Amendment of Law on the
Organization of People's Court
Resolution No. Politburo of 1/2/2002 On Justice Reform
08/NQ-TW of CPV
the CPV
Resolution No. Politburo of 1/3/2002 1 On Banned Works for Party
19- QD/TW of CPV Members
the Politburo
Law . National 4/2/2002 On the Organization of People's
I Assembly Courts
*-1E --- ce--------------------- ---------- ----------------------------------------Ordinance Standing 10/11/2002 On Judges and People's Jurors of
02/2002/PL- Committee of the People's Courts
UBTVQH11 N/A
Resolution Standing 11/4/2002 On Judges, People's Assessors
131/2002/NQ- 1 Committee of and Prosecutors
UBTVQHI1 I N/A
Resolution No Standing 2/25/200"3 On the Personnel and the Quantity
353/2003/NQ- iCommittee of , , of Judges in the Supreme People's
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TYPE OF AUTHOR DATE SUBJECT
LEGISLATION I
-------------------------- 
---------- ---- - -- -- - - -------------------------------
UBTVQHl 1 the National Court 2003
Assembly
- .--- - - ------------ ------------------------
Inter-Circular Supreme ' 4/1/2003 Guidelines on Ordinance on
No.01/2003/TTL People's Court- Judges and Jurors of the People's
T/TANDTC- The Ministry of i Courts.
BQP- BNV- Defence-The
UBTWMTTQV Ministry of
N Interior-The
Vietnam
Fatherland Front
Central
Committee
Decision Supreme 4/2/2003 Promulgation of the Working
No.46/2003/QD- People's Court Regulation of the Judicial
TCCB Selection Councils of the
provincial-level People's Courts,
I district-level People's Courts and
,-military zone-level military courts.
--- -- -- --- -- -- --- - - --- -  -- -- -- --
Decision Supreme . 4/2200 i-Promulgation of the Working
No.46/2003/QD- People's Court Regulation of the Judicial
TCCB Selection Councils of the
provincial-level People's Courts,
district-level People's Courts and
military zone-level military courts.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _I __ __ _ __ _
Notes
The following sources provide the legislation listed above:
The National Assembly Database, LAWDATA
Tong Thuat Chung Ket Qua Chinh Nghien Cuu de Tai, (General Abstract of the Principal
Research) (Hanoi 1996) (unpublished) (on file with authors)
CONG BAO [OFFICIAL GAZETTE].
VOL. 14 No. I
